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it has been claimed that demographic distribution and the drawing of constituency 
boundaries together had significant impacts on the outcomes of Fiji’s 1999, 
2001 and 2006 elections. in part, this was due to constitutionally entrenched 
provisions by which Fiji’s parliament mainly comprises members from ‘communal’ 
constituencies – currently 23 for the ethnic Fijians, 19 for the Fiji indians, three for 
the General voters and one for the island of rotuma – and a number (since 1997, 
25) of open constituencies, with the boundaries drawn in such a way that ‘voters 
should comprise a good proportion of members of different ethnic communities’.1 
the constituency Boundaries commission (cBc) could do little about the 
constitutionally entrenched provisions. nevertheless, many commentators felt 
that the 25 open constituencies were insufficiently heterogeneous. Furthermore, 
prior to the 2006 poll, many political parties claimed that substantial population 
movements over the period 1998 to 2006 necessitated some redrawing of the 
open constituency boundaries. the aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it outlines 
the process of electoral boundary demarcation for the 1999 election. Second, it 
explains the implications of the use of the 1998 boundaries in the 2006 election. 
it concludes with some reflections about the future.
Delimitation of constituencies in Fiji, under the constitution (Amendment) 
Act 1997, was an enormous undertaking in terms of time and resources. 
Delimiting was complicated because four different sets of boundaries had to 
be drawn – one set each for urban Fijian, General voter, ethnic indian and 
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the open constituencies. in addition, three provinces each had to be divided 
into two constituencies. the determination of the electoral boundaries by the 
cBc in 1998 was final and could not be challenged through the courts; it 
was intended to serve for the 1999 elections. However, these same electoral 
boundaries were also used in the elections of 2001 and 2006. 
Accurately delimited electoral boundaries ensure geographic representation 
for areas that may otherwise be neglected, and may improve the accountability 
of representatives to their voters. 
The legal framework (structure and rules)
the distribution of seats in Fiji’s House of representatives is determined, as 
follows, by section 52 of the 1997 constitution:
(2) in determining the boundaries of the constituencies for the election of members to the 
communal seats to be filled in accordance with subparagraph (51)(1a)(i), the constituency 
Boundaries commission: 
 (a) must ensure that the boundaries for 17 of the constituencies are in accordance 
with the provincial boundaries prescribed under the Fijian Affairs Act and that, subject to 
paragraph (b): 
 (i) the provinces of Ba, tailevu and cakaudrove comprise 2 constituencies each; 
and
 (ii) the other provinces comprise 1 constituency each;
 (b) must ensure that the remaining 6 constituencies comprise predominantly urban 
or peri-urban areas in which the number of voters is, as far as reasonably practicable, the 
same; and 
 (c) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), must give due consideration, in relation to each 
proposed constituency, to: 
 (i) the physical features of the proposed constituency; 
 (ii) the boundaries of existing recognized traditional areas; and
 (iii) means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency. 
(3) in determining the boundaries of the other constituencies, the constituency Boundaries 
commission: 
 (a) must try to ensure that the number of voters in each communal seat (other than a 
communal seat referred to in subsection (2)) is, as far as reasonably practicable, the same; 
 (b) must try to ensure that the number of voters in each open seat is, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the same; and 
 (c) subject to paragraph (a) or (b), must give due consideration, in relation to each 
proposed constituency, to: 
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 (i) the physical features of the proposed constituency; 
 (ii) the boundaries of existing administrative and recognised traditional areas;
 (iii) means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency; and 
 (iv) if the proposed constituency relates to an open seat – the principle that 
the voters should comprise a good proportion of members of different ethnic 
communities.
(4) in this section: 
communal seat means a seat to be filled in accordance with paragraph 51 (1)(a);
open seat means a seat to be filled in accordance with paragraph 51 (1)(b).
Delimitation of new electoral constituencies for the 1999 election
the cBc, charged with drawing up the boundaries for the 1999 election, 
was appointed for a term of 12 months. Different ministries cooperated in 
this undertaking, as did the cartography section of the ministry of lands, 
the public Service commission, Government printing and the Bureau of 
Statistics. the process involved a number of steps, including data collection, 
delimiting of constituencies and the evaluation of the boundaries before they 
were finalized.
Data collection involved obtaining the census population data and maps 
from the Bureau of Statistics. the Bureau provided the cBc with provisional 
results of the 1996 census covering the population aged 20 years and over. 
maps, needed to identify physical features, administrative boundaries, urban 
boundaries and enumeration areas (eAs), and to ensure that contiguous 
geographic population entities were allocated to constituencies, were provided 
by the ministry of lands.
While collecting all the data needed for delimitation, the cBc invited the 
public (political parties, provincial councils etc), through the press and radio, 
in english, Fijian and Hindi, to make submissions on prospective constituency 
boundaries. the original period for submissions (31 january to 1 February) 
was extended to 16 February because no submissions were received during the 
initial period. Still, very few submissions were received by the new deadline. 
residents of urban villages were also consulted about whether they wanted to 
be included alongside the urban Fijians or within the provincial communal 
constituencies.
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Problems with the database
the data provided by the Bureau of Statistics were only the provisional data 
from the 1996 population census. Furthermore, at the time, no registration of 
voters had taken place. the electoral commission was waiting for the cBc to 
complete its work before commencing registration. Hence, there was no voter 
registration roll to use. even when registration of voters began, not all eligible 
voters registered for the elections, despite the legal requirement for compulsory 
voting. in addition, the detailed local maps were in some instances dated or 
unavailable. 
Delimitation
The Fijian urban, Indian and General communal constituencies
the cBc determined the boundaries of the six Fijian urban communal 
constituencies, the three General communal constituencies and the 19 indian 
communal constituencies, as dictated by the constitutional requirement to 
‘ensure that the number of voters in each communal seat is, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the same’. each ethnic communal constituency followed the 
principle that ‘all voters should cast a vote of equal weight’. For example, an 
urban Fijian communal voter was supposed to cast a vote equal in weight to that 
of another urban Fijian communal voter and an indian communal voter in any 
one constituency was supposed to cast a vote of equal weight to that of an indian 
communal voter in any other constituency. the ideal average of voters in the six 
Fijian urban communal constituencies was 12,173; the indian urban communal 
average was 9,621; while that for the three General communal constituencies 
was 6,036. All the Fijian urban communal constituencies were within the 
(+/-)10 per cent tolerance levels; all the General communal constituencies were 
within the (+/-) 15 per cent tolerance levels and all the indian urban communal 
constituencies were within the (+/-) 20 per cent tolerance levels (tables 22.1, 
22.2 and 22.3). in these constituencies, the geographical size did not matter. 
However, the cBc tried to ensure that, as much as possible, the electoral 
boundaries coincided with communities of interest.
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Table 22.2 General Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 18,108
number of constituencies = 3
Average number of people per constituency = 6,036
maximum and minimum number of electors per General communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (604) 15 per cent (905)
maximum number of voters 6,640 6,941
minimum number of voters 5,432 5,134
note: only 1 of 3 constituencies – north eastern General communal constituency – was outside the 10 
per cent tolerance level; all were within the 15 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.1 Fijian Urban Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 72,776
number of constituencies = 6
Average number of people per constituency = 12,129
maximum and minimum number of electors per Fijian urban communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,213) 15 per cent (1,819)
maximum number of voters 13,342 13,948
minimum number of voters 10,196 10,310
note: All 6 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.3 Indian Communal constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 182,799
number of constituencies = 19
Average number of people per constituency = 9,621
maximum and minimum number of electors per indian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (962) 15 per cent (1,443) 20 per cent (1,924)
maximum number of voters 10,583 11,064 11,545
minimum number of voters 8,659 8,178 9,697
note: 15 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 4 of 19 constituencies – Viti levu 
east maritime, tavua, labasa and Bua/macuata West indian communal constituencies – were outside 
the 10 per cent tolerance level; only 1 of 19 constituencies – Bua/macuata West – was outside the 20 per 
cent tolerance level.
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The open constituencies
Section 52(3)(b), (c)(i-iv) of the constitution (Amendment) Act 1997 stipulates 
that the cBc must ensure that the number of voters in each seat is, as far as is 
practicable, the same, and section 52 (3) (c) requires it to give due consideration 
in relation to each proposed constituency to:
i. the physical features of the proposed constituency
ii. the boundaries of existing administrative and recognized traditional areas 
iii. the means of communication and travel within the proposed constituency and
iv. the principle that voters should comprise a good proportion of members of different 
 ethnic groups.
Delimitation of the open constituencies was quite a difficult undertaking 
because the constitution required them to have parity of numbers as well as a 
good proportion of different ethnic groups. in the real world, of course, people 
do not settle in a place for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements for drawing 
up the ideal constituency. ethnic indians tend to concentrate in western Viti 
levu, northern Vanua levu and urban areas. the outer islands, the interior 
of the two main islands and the urban areas are largely populated by ethnic 
Fijians. the cBc considered dividing the two main islands into strips or into 
oblong-shaped constituencies, but was restricted by other considerations as 
stipulated in the constitution, such as respect for administrative boundaries, 
geographic criteria and community of interest. electorates were also to be 
contiguous geographic areas.
the cBc attempted to have parity of numbers of voters in every open seat 
so that all voters would cast a vote of equal weight. this resulted in the number 
of voters in all but one constituency falling within the 10 per cent tolerance 
level (table 22.4).
Delimitation of the open constituencies resulted in ten of them being 
dominated by Fijians and ten by indians. the remaining five had close to 
parity of numbers in the two major ethnic groups. the current situation of 
dominance of most open seats by a particular ethnic group will not change, 
because of the demographic situation. However, many commentators, including 
political parties, want the number of open constituencies to be increased to 45, 
as recommended by the reeves commission. 
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After the electoral boundaries were delimited, the public was again invited 
to make submissions to the cBc regarding the proposed boundaries. many 
comments suggested minor additions to or contractions of the constituencies. 
these were considered before the final determination of Fiji’s electoral 
boundaries. there were no objections. many political parties, including 
the Soqosoqo ni Vakatulewa ni taukei (SVt) and the national Federation 
party (nFp), major parties at the time, were very happy with the proposed 
boundaries.
However, some academics were critical of the determination of the electoral 
boundaries.2 they wanted more of the ethnically mixed open constituencies. 
they had hailed the adoption of the AV system in Fiji, believing it to be the 
most appropriate system. they and the architects of the constitution believed 
that the AV system would promote cooperation across ethnic lines. they were 
particularly critical of the large number of open constituencies created by 
the cBc determination of the electoral boundaries that did not have a good 
proportion of different ethnic groups. the effective operation of AV as a tool 
for promoting ethnic accommodation depended on these constituencies having 
near parity of numbers in relation to the two major ethnic groups in Fiji.
the past three elections have shown that even the ethnically mixed open 
constituencies did not bring about cross-ethnic vote trading or genuine inter-
ethnic cooperation. coalitions were created purely for electoral advantage, rather 
than on the basis of genuine shared goals and values. most parties tried to win 
Table 22.4 Open constituencies, 1998
number of people 21 years of age and over (provisional 1996 population census results) = 403,625
number of constituencies = 25
Average number of people per constituency = 16,145
maximum and minimum number of electors per open constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,615) 15 per cent (2,422)
maximum number of voters 17,760 18,567
minimum number of voters 14,530 13,723
note: only 1 of 25 constituencies – cakaudrove West open constituency – was outside the 10 per cent 
tolerance level.
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seats on the first count. moderates, who the electoral engineers assumed were 
going to be successful, were obliterated. the AV system had the opposite to its 
anticipated effect – it resulted in limited representation of some of the moderate 
parties and increased ethnic polarization. if moderation and inter-ethnic 
cooperation are to be achieved, we need to rethink our electoral system. 
The case for redistribution in 2006
redistribution is the process of altering electoral boundaries to accommodate 
changes and movements in population. in 2005, the Bureau of Statistics 
acknowledged that there had been much internal movement of people in 
Fiji since the previous census in 1996, but admitted that there was no way of 
obtaining accurate and detailed data on current population distribution because 
there had been no more recent census. redistribution can be controversial, 
especially in open constituencies with near parity of different ethnic 
populations, because those who are included in or excluded from an electoral 
constituency can determine the election outcome. in other words, there is the 
potential for gerrymandering. redistribution is important to political parties 
because it can affect their support base.
the decision to change the boundaries must be taken well before a general 
election to ensure transparency, particularly when there has been considerable 
internal movement of population. A number of politicians called for the review 
and change in boundaries for the 2006 election.3 the members of the cBc 
were appointed in early 2005, a year before the general election, to review the 
electoral boundaries and to determine whether or not to alter them.4
The electoral boundaries: to alter or not to alter
Database
the 1996 census figures were the only official figures available to the cBc in 
2005, so the cBc could not ascertain the shifts in Fiji’s population since 1996. 
they therefore commissioned the Bureau of Statistics to undertake a survey of 
urban and peri-urban constituencies to assess populations. the Bureau surveyed 
13 open constituencies to compare the data with the 1996 census data. the 
survey started in April 2005 and took seven months to complete. the cBc 
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was able to establish that there had been population growth in a number of 
constituencies and declines in others. the constituencies that had significant 
gains were nadi open, cunningham open, nausori/naitasiri open and 
nasinu/rewa open, while losses were recorded in labasa open, Suva city 
open and Vuda open. Survey results also established that the ethnic proportions 
remained stable despite the changes in total population of the constituencies. 
the survey was, however, a futile exercise, because the cBc could not get data 
for the areas not surveyed in order to make meaningful ‘redistricting’ possible. 
they were, however, satisfied with the unchanging ethnic distribution within 
the constituencies surveyed and, as a result, made no attempt to increase the 
number of heterogeneous open constituencies. 
As mentioned earlier, the cBc sought public comment on the proposed 
boundaries in january and February 2006. Almost all groups that made 
submissions wanted to maintain the current boundaries because current 
population data were not available to review. in addition, the electoral 
commission was using the 1998 electoral boundaries in its voter registration 
program and it would have been a mammoth task to reallocate people within 
new boundaries, especially in the time available. As a result, the cBc determined 
that there should be no change to the existing constituency boundaries for the 
2006 election.
Table 22.5 Fijian Urban Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 95,582
number of constituencies = 6
Average number of people per constituency = 15,930
maximum and minimum number of electors per Fijian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,593) 15 per cent (2,390)
maximum number of voters 17,523 18,320
minimum number of voters 14,330 13,540
note: 4 of 6 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 5 of 6 constituencies were within 
the 15 per cent tolerance level; 1 constituency – Suva city Fiji urban communal – was outside the 20 
per cent tolerance level.
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Malapportionment
malapportionment refers to the discrepancy between the shares of parliamentary 
seats and the shares of population by constituencies. it applies when a set of 
boundaries in each of the ethnic reserved seats (Fijian urban communal 
constituencies, the General communal, and the indian communal) and 
in the open constituencies have unequal numbers of voters. in other 
words, malapportionment refers to uneven distribution within each type of 
constituency, not to that constitutionally entrenched inequality in the value of 
votes between the different types of constituency. malapportionment violates 
the principle that all voters should cast a vote of equal weight and can occur 
if constituencies are not redrawn to accommodate population movements. 
malapportionment was seen in the 2006 election in the indian communal 
constituencies and the open constituencies, where a number of constituencies 
lie outside the 20 per cent tolerance level (tables 22.5, 22.6, 22.7 and 22.8).
The future
if elections in Fiji are to be egalitarian, there is a need to redraw the electoral 
boundaries to reflect population shift in the past decade. redistribution must 
be undertaken two or three years before an election to ensure transparency. 
the constitution stipulates that redistribution must be done after each census. 
However, there are other factors that are important in redistribution, such as the 
proportion of constituencies that experience significant change in population 
proportions, and whether or not there are marked departures from any proposed 
and accepted prescribed levels. 
redistribution in future will depend on Fiji’s changing population 
composition. Bureau of Statistics’ projections for 2006 show Fijians as making 
up 54.7 per cent of the population, ethnic indians 38.1 per cent and others 
7.2 per cent. in addition, Bakker’s (forthcoming)5 analysis of Fijian and indian 
fertility shows that Fijian fertility decline is slow compared with that of indians. 
the indian fertility decline is resulting in a below replacement level of fertility. 
the impact of this will be reflected in the ethnic distribution of the population 
in future, and of course on the delimitation of electoral boundaries.
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Table 22.6 General Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 13,820
number of constituencies = 3
Average number of people per constituency = 4,607
maximum and minimum number of electors per General communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (461) 15 per cent (691)
maximum number of voters 5,068 5,298
minimum number of voters 4,146 3,916
note: 1of 3 constituencies was within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 1 constituency – Western/central 
General communal – was outside the 15 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.7 Indian Communal constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 204,477
number of constituencies = 19
Average number of people per constituency = 10,762
maximum and minimum number of electors per indian communal constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,076) 15 per cent (1,614) 20 per cent (2,152)
maximum number of voters 11,838 12,376 12,914
minimum number of voters 9,686 9,148 8,610
note: 7 of 19 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; 8 constituencies were within 
the 15 per cent tolerance level; 9 constituencies were within the 20 per cent tolerance level; 10 indian 
communal constituencies – Viti levu east maritime, tavua, Ba east, nadi urban, Viti levu South/
Kadavu, Vanua levu West, laucala, nasinu, labasa rural and macuta east/cakaudrove – were outside 
the 20 per cent tolerance level.
Table 22.8 Open constituencies, 2006
number of people 21 years of age and over (number of registered voters – elections office) = 479,693
number of constituencies = 25
Average number of people per constituency = 19,188
maximum and minimum number of electors per open constituency
tolerance level 10 per cent (1,919) 15 per cent (2,878) 20 per cent (3,837)
maximum number of voters 21,106 22,065 23,024
minimum number of voters 17,268 16,309 15,350
note: 15 of 25 constituencies were within the 10 per cent tolerance level; another 4 constituencies were 
within the 15 per cent tolerance level; another 3 – were within  the 20 per cent tolerance level; three 
constituencies – cunningham open, nadi open and Suva city open – were outside the 20 per cent 
tolerance level.
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